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FEATURE COMMENT: Suing The 
Government As A ‘Joint Employer’—
Evolving Pathologies Of The Blended 
Workforce
The contemporary Federal Government’s nature, as 
a hollowed-out, insatiable consumer of services, is 
increasingly well documented. Many of the public 
policy and economic risks associated with this phe-
nomenon have been acknowledged, but not all of the 
pathologies an outsourced Government breeds are 
fully understood. 
As the “blended workforce”—a realm in which 
contractors work alongside, and often are indistin-
guishable from, their Government counterparts—
becomes more commonplace, the distinction between 
civil servants, members of the military and contractor 
employees increasingly blurs. Indeed, as agencies 
routinely rely on service contracts—or, more spe-
cifically, employee augmentation agreements—to 
supplement their depleted Government staffs, the 
long-standing statutory/regulatory prohibition 
against personal service contracts is increasingly 
perceived as a dead letter. 
Alas, the Government’s experience and sophis-
tication in managing and supervising the blended 
workforce lags its growth. One intriguing (and, 
apparently, accelerating), yet little-known trend is 
that contractor employees are more frequently su-
ing the Government, alleging employment discrimi-
nation on the part of Government managers, super-
visors or even coworkers. That seems like quite a 
wrench to throw into the contractual relationship.
How Did We Get To This Point?—If the idea 
of contractor employees suing Government super-
visors sounds unnatural to you, you are not alone. 
Indeed, to many familiar with the traditional rela-
tionship between a Government customer and its 
contractor, it is surprising that these suits even exist. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits—and provides remedies for individuals sub-
jected to—employment discrimination. See 42 USCA 
§§ 2000e to e-17 (2006). Title VII’s reach is broad, 
making it illegal for employers to discriminate on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
age, disability, or genetic information,” or to retaliate 
against an individual for filing a charge of discrimi-
nation, participating in an investigation, or opposing 
discriminatory practices. 29 CFR § 1614.101 (2010). 
Discrimination is defined as denying any of these 
suspect groups “the same employment, promotion, 
membership, or other employment opportunities as 
have been available to other employees or applicants.” 
29 CFR § 1607.11 (2010). For the purposes of Title 
VII, disparate treatment can occur in any aspect of 
employment, including, among other things: hiring 
and firing, assignment or transfer of employees, or 
other terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, 
the last category proves the most flexible in practice. 
Of course, no one sues the Federal Government 
without its permission. Sovereign immunity is a well 
established principle in this country. Accordingly, 
when Congress amended Title VII, in 1972, to protect 
federal employees, see 42 USCA § 2000e-16 (2006), it 
extended the Federal Government’s liability to only 
“those individuals in a direct employment relationship 
with a government employer.” Spirides v. Reinhardt, 
613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979). At the time, Con-
gress never contemplated that contractor personnel 
might exploit these protections against Government 
supervisors. Indeed, the civil service laws specifically 
require that all federal employees be “appointed in 
the civil service.” 5 USCA § 2105(a) (2006). And it is 
pretty clear that contractor personnel, by definition, 
are not appointed to the civil service.
More than 30 years ago, however, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
panded Title VII’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
and enabled certain contractor personnel, in unique 
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circumstances, to sue the Government for employment 
discrimination. In Spirides, a female foreign language 
broadcaster, working as an independent contractor 
for the U.S. International Communication Agency 
(USICA), sued it for sex discrimination. The court held 
that it was improper to apply the narrow 5 USCA § 
2105(a) definition of “federal employee” to Title VII 
cases, because § 2105(a) applies only to the civil service 
laws. In a moment of prescience, the court clarified that 
Title VII should be liberally construed because it is 
remedial in character. Specifically, the court explained 
that “[u]se of the restrictive civil service definition ... 
would not effectuate the broad remedial purposes of 
the Act, and would therefore be inappropriate.” Spiri-
des, 613 F.2d at 831. 
 Instead, the court defined employee by apply-
ing “general principles of the law of agency to [the] 
undisputed or established facts” of the case. Id. This 
approach requires an examination of all aspects of the 
relationship between the individual and the alleged 
employer to determine if an employment relation-
ship exists. While no single factor is determinative, 
the most important element is the extent to which 
the employer has the right to control the means and 
manner of the individual’s work performance. “If 
an employer has the right to control and direct the 
work of an individual, not only as to the result to be 
achieved, but also as to the details by which that re-
sult is achieved, an employer/employee relationship 
is likely to exist.” Id. at 831–32.
Explosion of Service Contracts—At the time, 
this had little effect on the relationship between the 
Federal Government and its contractors. The situa-
tion in Spirides was unique; USICA had authority un-
der 22 USCA § 1471(5) (1970) to hire foreign language 
broadcasters “without regard to the civil service and 
classification laws.” Most federal agencies had not 
yet employed large cadres of contractor personnel to 
augment, and often work alongside, civil servants. 
The prohibition on personal service contracting was 
still respected, and federal agencies were cognizant of 
the need to avoid situations that created employment-
type relationships with contractors. 
By the 1990s, however, in the name of “new public 
management,” the Clinton administration aggressive-
ly turned to the private sector as it trumpeted a mas-
sive Government downsizing initiative. Clinton-era 
budgets suggested that they represented the smallest 
Government since the Kennedy administration. Fed-
eral employee rolls (and, particularly, members of the 
acquisition workforce) were reduced out of a political 
desire to “end the era of big Government.” According 
to Paul Light, over 418,000 federal civil servant jobs 
were cut as part of this effort between 1990 and 2002. 
Light, Fact Sheet on the New True Size of Govern-
ment 5 (2003), available at www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/articles/2003/0905politics_light/
light20030905.pdf; see also Light, “Outsourcing and 
the True Size of Government,” 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 311 
(2004). The second Bush administration continued 
this bipartisan trend. Now, two decades later, federal 
agencies find themselves, in reality, left with little 
more than a skeletal workforce that lacks the in-
house personnel resources to sufficiently achieve their 
mandates and perform the Government’s broad range 
of duties and responsibilities. 
To cope with this situation, the Federal Govern-
ment had no choice but to outsource functions to 
contractors. Agencies dramatically increased their use 
of service, and particularly employee-augmentation, 
contracts. One estimate suggests that more than 
one-third of a million service contractor jobs were 
created between 1990 and 2002. Overall, from 1999 
to 2002, as many as 727,000 contractor jobs were cre-
ated to support the Federal Government. Light, Fact 
Sheet, supra, at 5. More than half a million of these 
jobs were created in the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Energy and NASA. Id. at 6. Services 
absorbed increasingly large portions of the federal 
procurement budget; by 2005, over 60 percent of 
federal procurement dollars were spent on service 
contracts. See 49 GC ¶ 2.
In light of the last decade’s military actions, the 
trend worked its way into the public’s consciousness. 
For the last few years, more contractors have served in 
Iraq and Afghanistan than members of the military. In-
deed, these contractors not only perform more military-
related tasks and support functions, but they also face 
the risks associated with performing those functions. 
This has led to a stark increase in the number of con-
tractor fatalities on the battlefield, particularly since 
2007. Overall, more than 2,000 contractor personnel 
have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most dis-
turbingly, in the first half of this year, more contractor 
personnel than U.S. military service members died in 
these countries. See Schooner & Swan, “Contractors 
and the Ultimate Sacrifice,” Service Contractor 16 
(September 2010).
This massive outsourcing also exacerbated a 
deepening contract-management crisis. It is now 
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well understood that the demands on the purchas-
ing community have increased dramatically since 
2001. As a result, we more frequently witness a 
triage-type focus on buying which severely limits 
the resources available for contract administration. 
See 47 GC ¶ 203. This is caused in part by “the ad-
ditional demands that service contracting places on 
the acquisition workforce.” Report of the Acquisition 
Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy and the United States Congress 356 (2007), 
available at www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/final
aapreport.html. Service contracts often require greater 
involvement and attention from acquisition personnel 
during the contract formation process, as well as in 
contract management and oversight, “in order to en-
able the government to ensure that it is receiving the 
services for which it has contracted.” Id. 
More significantly, for the purposes of this discus-
sion, the increased reliance on employee-augmentation 
contracts has blurred the distinction between contrac-
tor employees and civil servants in the Government 
workspace. Despite the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion’s long-standing prohibition on personal service 
contracts, see FAR 37.104, agencies have increasingly 
relied on these types of contractual relationships to 
fulfill their missions. Specific statutory and regulatory 
authorizations allowing agencies to hire temporary 
workers, consultants and experts have become volu-
minous. And, in the absence of appropriate waivers 
of the personal services prohibition, the bar is simply 
ignored. Today, it is not unusual in most agencies to 
find contractor personnel and civil servants working 
in the same offices and, all too often, performing the 
same or similar functions.
The Evolving Joint Employer Liability 
Doctrine—As hordes of contractor employees began 
working alongside civil servants, federal courts and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) faced a rising number of employment dis-
crimination complaints brought by these contractor 
employees against their federal supervisors. In their 
attempt to adjudicate these complaints, the federal 
courts and the EEOC returned to the Spirides analy-
sis. 
As the Spirides doctrine evolved, the EEOC and 
federal courts began employing slightly different no-
menclature to describe their analyses. For example, 
the EEOC prefers the term “common law agency test”; 
whereas some federal courts prefer the terms “Spiri-
des test” or the “joint employment test.” All of these 
tests, however, apply the same common law agency 
principles that take into account the entirety of the 
relationship between the individual and the federal 
agency, with the most important factor being whether 
the potential employer has the right to control the 
individual’s work performance. The different tests, in 
practice, generally produce similar results. 
The Federal Courts: Spirides Applied to 
Joint Employer Liability—In 1995, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
broadened the application of Spirides to situations 
in which an aggrieved individual sues the Federal 
Government despite being a primary employee of an 
independent contractor, such as a staffing agency or 
temporary hiring firm. In King v. Dalton, 895 F. Supp. 
831, 834–35 (E.D. Va. 1995), Stephanie King was 
employed by a contractor providing support services 
for the installation of naval satellite communication 
systems. When King became subject to the unwanted 
advances of, and derogatory comments by, the naval 
supervisor in charge of planning and executing the 
project, she brought a sexual harassment suit against 
the Navy. Although the court found that King was not 
a joint employee of the contractor and the Navy, the 
court stated that the contractor’s “undisputed status 
as King’s employer does not automatically preclude a 
finding that the Navy shared that status during the 
time period in question.” King, 895 F. Supp. at 837. 
In essence, King starkly established the proposi-
tion that the Federal Government could no longer 
shield itself from liability simply by asserting it does 
not directly employ or pay contractor personnel. The 
concept of “joint employer liability” was previously 
applied in Title VII cases in the private employment 
context. See, e.g., Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., 30 
F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that owner of 
ocean-side hotel employing a management contractor 
was a joint employer of the contractor’s employee). 
King, however, was the first case to apply this concept 
to the Federal Government. 
Since King, the D.C. Circuit has accepted the idea 
that the Federal Government can be considered a “joint 
employer” for Title VII purposes. In Redd v. Summers, 
232 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2000), Trayon Redd, a 
tour guide assigned by a personnel corporation to the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, sued the Bureau 
for discriminatory termination. The court applied the 
Spirides test to determine whether the Bureau could 
be considered Redd’s “joint employer,” although the 
court opined that it would have preferred to use the 
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nomenclature of the Third Circuit’s “joint employment 
test.” See Redd, 232 F.3d at 938 (The Third Circuit’s 
test asks whether “one employer[,] while contracting 
in good faith with an otherwise independent company, 
has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees” of the 
contractor. (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982))). While Redd 
ultimately failed to obtain the relief she sought, the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion further solidified the idea that a 
federal agency, in certain situations, may be considered 
a “joint employer” of a contractor employee. 
The EEOC and Common Law Agency—Leap-
ing the chasm from precedent to policy less than 
two years after King, the EEOC issued enforcement 
guidance specifically stating that “a federal agency 
qualifies as a joint employer of an individual assigned 
to it if it has the requisite control over that worker.” 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 915-002, 
Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to 
Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employ-
ment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms 7 (1997), 
available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/conting.html. 
Soon after, in 1998, the EEOC appeared to break 
new ground in Ma v. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., EEOC Decision No. 01962390 (1998). Ma and 
her husband conducted biomedical research while 
serving as visiting fellows at the National Institutes 
of Health. Ma claimed that when she informed her 
research supervisor that she was pregnant, he en-
couraged the couple to abort the pregnancy, began to 
closely monitor her activities and pressured her not 
to request heightened protection from radiation. Ma 
recognized that Title VII specifically prohibits sex-
based discrimination, which includes discrimination 
based on pregnancy and childbirth. Accordingly, Ma 
sued her federal “employer.” 
The EEOC decided to apply the “common law 
agency test” to determine if Ma was an NIH employee, 
recognizing that “the factors listed for consideration 
in the Spirides decision are drawn from the common 
law of agency test.” Ma, EEOC Decision No. 01962390 
at 8. The EEOC relied on the common law agency 
test for two reasons: (1) Title VII does not specifically 
define “federal employee” beyond the general defini-
tion of “an individual employed by an employer,” id. 
at 7 (quoting 42 USCA § 2000e(f) (1994)); and (2) the 
U.S. Supreme Court previously stated that “[w]here 
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 
meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, 
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress 
means to incorporate the established meaning of 
these terms,” id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)). The EEOC 
ultimately determined that Ma and her husband were 
not NIH employees for Title VII purposes. Ma may 
have lost her case, but her struggles now represent 
landmark precedent. More than 338 additional EEOC 
decisions have now referenced Ma. 
One More Nail in the Personal Services Cof-
fin—The federal courts’ and the EEOC’s willingness 
to define federal agencies as de facto employers of 
contractor employees is further evidence that the pro-
hibition on personal service contracts is—or should 
now be deemed—a dead letter. For example, the AAP in 
2007 recommended an easing of the personal services 
prohibition “to promote efficient management of the 
blended federal workforce.” See 48 GC ¶ 282. The AAP 
report began with the premise that this prohibition 
“doesn’t take proper recognition of where we are as a 
workforce today.” Acquisition Advisory Panel, supra, 
at 400. The proliferation of statutory exceptions to 
the prohibition, combined with the fact that “agencies 
often ignore the prohibition” anyway, see 48 GC ¶ 282, 
indicates that the prohibition is a legal abstraction 
with little remaining relevance to practical reality. See 
also Schooner & Greenspahn, “Too Dependent on Con-
tractors? Minimum Standards For Responsible Gover-
nance,” J. Cont. Mgmt. 16 (Summer 2008). Ultimately, 
it is hard to manage a problem when you deny it exists. 
Accordingly, it is time for either the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy or Congress (or both) to revisit the 
utility of perpetuating the now anachronistic personal 
services prohibition.
More Government Challenges in Managing 
the Blended Workforce—Our sense is that most 
Government managers and contracting professionals 
have not fully recognized their potential liability as 
a joint employer of contractor personnel. Indeed, it 
seems that even knowledgeable professionals are un-
aware that this potential liability exists. For example, 
application of joint employer liability to federal agen-
cies seems directly contrary to the AAP’s conclusion 
that “the activities that are currently barred as [per-
sonal service contracts] by the FAR would not create 
... an employer-employee relationship.” Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, supra, at 404. 
The courts’ and EEOC’s application of joint em-
ployer liability further demonstrates how important 
it is for federal agencies to train not only managers 
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but all Government personnel—whether political 
appointees, senior executive service, civil servants, 
military officers and even enlisted personnel—in 
how to appropriately supervise and interact with 
contractors. It is unrealistic to assume that, at any 
time in the near future, federal agencies will be able 
to significantly reduce their reliance on contractor 
employees and temporary hires. Frankly, the Gov-
ernment “currently has no short-term option but to 
rely on contractors for every conceivable task that 
it lacks appropriate staff to fulfill.” Schooner and 
Greenspahn, supra, at 10. As a result, Government 
personnel need to be aware of the growing liabilities 
associated with both managing and operating within 
a blended workforce. A broad range of remedies are 
available for employment discrimination, including, 
among others, back pay, reinstatement, other actions 
that will make an individual “whole,” attorneys’ fees, 
expert witness fees and court costs.
 But this is not merely a fiscal issue. From both 
an organizational and a human resources viewpoint, 
employment discrimination suits have the potential 
to disrupt and destabilize the workplace. 
 Still, it is easy to see the potential risk to 
Government agencies. One of the most compelling ar-
guments that frustrated Government managers offer 
in support of outsourcing has been that it is easier for 
them to jettison individual contractor employees, for 
whatever reason, than to terminate or reassign civil 
servants. These federal managers fail to realize, how-
ever, that a contractor employee’s denial of a preferred 
assignment or an employment opportunity could spur 
a discrimination claim against their agency. Moreover, 
Government managers must recognize that there are 
limits, particularly in offices and organizations in 
which either civil servants or contractors have alleged 
discrimination. Specifically, Title VII makes it illegal 
to retaliate against an individual for filing a charge 
of discrimination, opposing discriminatory practices, 
or “participating in any stage of administrative or 
judicial proceedings.” 29 CFR § 1614.101(b) (2010). 
 Behavioral norms vary widely among the 
military, the civil service and contractor organiza-
tions. Indeed, they also vary within each of these 
categories—among the military services, among 
various agencies and departments, and throughout 
the private sector. Most Government supervisors 
know better than to ask a subordinate out on a date, 
but they may not appreciate the risks associated 
with similarly approaching a contractor employee. 
Government managers must understand that sexual 
harassment includes not only “[u]nwelcome sexual 
advances [and] requests for sexual favors” but also 
“other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature 
... [that] ... has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work-
ing environment.” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (2010). These 
types of relationships can prove problematic, even 
among individuals that appear to be peers. The EEOC 
makes clear that 
[s]exual harassment can occur in a variety of 
circumstances …. The victim does not have to be 
of the opposite sex. The harasser can be the vic-
tim’s supervisor, … a supervisor in another area, 
a co-worker, or a non-employee. The victim does 
not have to be the person harassed but could be 
anyone affected by the offensive conduct.
Facts About Sexual Harassment, Equal Emp’t Op-
portunity Comm’n (June 27, 2002), www.eeoc.gov/
facts/fs-sex.html (emphasis added). The potential 
for a hostile work environment claim does not seem 
far-fetched. 
 Looking ahead, particularly as the admin-
istration struggles with the military’s “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy, discrimination claims brought by 
contractor employees based on sexual orientation 
could raise some serious concerns, particularly if 
contractors are supporting the military. As a general 
rule, the EEOC does not protect against discrimina-
tion and harassment based on sexual orientation. 
See Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 
Status as a Parent, Marital Status and Political Af-
filiation, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, www.
eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2010). However, EO 13087 amended EO 
11478 to include sexual orientation as a prohibited 
basis for discrimination. See EO 13087, 63 Fed. Reg. 
30097 (May 28, 1998). Although sexual orientation 
as a basis for discrimination is currently still not 
actionable under Title VII, the current environment 
suggests that this could change in the future. This 
would raise some additional risks, particularly for 
military supervisors. 
Federal managers also need to recognize the dis-
ruptive effects these suits can cause. Training and 
other preventive measures are critical. But who is 
providing federal supervisors with the appropriate 
training? To implement appropriate measures, su-
pervisors need to be aware of this phenomenon and 
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understand how it affects their workplace. Above all, 
federal managers need to appreciate that they can no 
longer hide behind a formalistic employee-contractor 
distinction. As this precedent develops, both in con-
creteness and in volume, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult (nay, impossible) for Congress to put the genie 
back in the bottle. 
Contractors Beware: Unanticipated Risk to 
Maintaining Customer Satisfaction—The Govern-
ment’s status as a joint employer also has implica-
tions on the other side of the table. Contractors need 
to appreciate how this phenomenon will affect their 
relationship with their Government customer. Unless 
proper mechanisms are in place to adequately address 
employment issues before they arise, the resulting 
discrimination suits by employees could have devas-
tating effects on the company’s future as a Govern-
ment contractor. Consider, for example, that the EEO 
regime is perceived as being particularly susceptible 
to frivolous suits, often brought by disgruntled (or dis-
missed) employees. Moreover, it does not require much 
creativity to see how the Government might punish 
contractors—with, e.g., negative past performance rat-
ings or potentially suspensions or debarment—when 
those firms’ employees brought (either substantiated 
or unsubstantiated) discrimination allegations against 
Government officials. 
Perhaps most importantly, both the Government 
and its contractors need to understand that, as fed-
eral agencies continue to rely on contractors for their 
staffing needs, the ability to distinguish between civil 
servants and contractors—in the eyes of the law—
will become increasingly more difficult. We know the 
blended workforce is here to stay. We don’t yet know 
what that really means.
F
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